Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 20

Issue 3

Article 8

1969

Municipal Collective Bargaining Agreements: Are They Ultra
Vires?
James d'A Welch

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James d'A Welch, Municipal Collective Bargaining Agreements: Are They Ultra Vires?, 20 Case W. Rsrv. L.
Rev. 637 (1969)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol20/iss3/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

1969]

Municipal Collective BargainingAgreements:
Are They Ultra Vires?

S

while not a new phenomenon,1
are becoming of increasing concern. Such strikes not only pose
a serious threat to the safety and welfare of our cities because of
their disruptive effect upon essential services, but, along with other
less obvious forms of disruption,2 they are symptomatic of the dissatisfaction of public employees with the terms and conditions of
their employment, including their inability to improve their position
in the absence of a legally effective negotiation process.
The absence of such a process is indicative of the outmoded approach taken by public personnel administrators who, during a
period of 3 decades of rapidly increasing public employment,3 have
failed to respond to the complexity of employment problems accompanying such an expansion. These administrators have continued to apply antiquated concepts and traditions which have effectively denied the public servants any meaningful voice in the
terms of their employment. Accordingly, public employees have
turned to the use of the strike, as well as other militant labor practices, in order to achieve their demands.
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the restoration of stable
labor relations in the public sector will require a more meaningful
response from the public employer than merely to make such practices illegal.4 Rather than providing ephemeral solutions, efforts
TRIKES BY MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,

ISee D. ZISKIND, ONE THOUSAND STRIKES OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 50
(1940); Krislov, Work Stoppages of Government Employees, 1942-59, 1 Q. REV. EcON.
& Bus. 87 (1961). The current public employee strike problem is discussed in Note,
The Strike and its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966 Wis. L REV. 548, 55059.
2 Other less apparent methods include malingering on the job, over-scrupulous adherence to the rules, and refusal to work overtime. Wortman, Labor Relations in Government Services, 15 LAB. I.J. 482, 489 (1964).
3 During the period from 1950 to 1966 employment by local governments has increased from 3,288,000 to 6,407,000 employees. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, 1968 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 429 (Table No.
605).
4 Strikes by public employees, for example, are universally prohibited either by
statute or judicial decision. E.g., City of Los Angeles, v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949); Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v.
Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); Local 976, IBEW v. Grand River
Dam Authority, 292 P.2d 1018 (Okla. 1956); Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, 52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
839.221 (1965); 12A MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(2) (1968); ORE. REV. STAT. §
243.760 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, § 215.2 (Purdon 1964).
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should be directed toward alleviating the underlying sources of
strife. The successful experience in the private sector with the collective bargaining process illustrates that the establishment of formal
channels of communication through which municipal employees can
express their grievances may help reduce the causes of their dissatisfaction and promote stable labor relations in the public sector.5
Although legislative reform covering the entire employment relationship may be necessary to achieve optimum results, only a few
states have taken the initiative.6 Nevertheless, there is ample latitude within the existing legal framework to accommodate collective
bargaining agreements by municipalities.
I.

THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
EMPLOYEES

Public employers have not been subjected to the same duties toward their employees as have employers in private industry. 7 Federal" and state9 labor relations acts have either expressly excluded
governmental employees from their provisions, or an exclusion has
been provided by judicial decision. 10 The basic reason for the dis5 Ironically, this widespread growth of public employee dissatisfaction has occurred
at a time of declining union membership in the private sector and rising public acceptance of the institution of unionism. Thus, unions are successfully invading the relatively virgin territory of public employment with remarkable success. The largest union
representing state and local employees - the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees - reports that during a recent 10-year period it increased its
membership from approximately 90,000 to almost 300,000. Wurf, Unions Enter City
Hall, 48 PUB. MANAGEMENT 245 (1966). In addition, the growth rate of this union
has been five times greater than that of the American labor movement as a whole.
6 Several states have passed comprehensive legislation extending to public employees
the right to engage in collective bargaining and imposing other regulations on the employment relationship. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467 to -477 (Supp.
1968); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, §§ 178G-N (Supp. 1968); MCH. STAT. ANN.
§ 17.454(27) (1960), as amended, §§ 17.455(8)-(16) (Supp. 1968); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.70 (Supp. 1968).
7 Laborers in private industry have been afforded the rights to organize, to bargain
collectively with their employers, and to strike; employers are under the duties to engage
in good faith negotiation with their employees and to refrain from restraining or coercing their employees in the exercise of their rights. National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151, 157-58 (1964).
8ad. at § 152(2), which provides "[tjhe term 'employer' . . . shall not include the
United States or any wholly owned Government corporation ... or any state or political
subdivision thereof ....
9
See, e.g., N.Y. LABOR LAW § 715 (McKinney 1965), which provides "Et]he
provisions of this article shall not apply to ... employees of the state or of any political
or civil subdivision or other agency thereof .... "
10 See Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946);
Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946); Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
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tinction was the belief that public employees, unlike those in private
industry, did not need additional protections in order to be afforded
fair treatment. Restraint on the freedom of private employers was
deemed necessary because the private employers were able to adopt
any policy towards their employees which they believed would promote the success of their enterprises, without regard to the effect on
the welfare of their employees. Public employers, on the other
hand, had less freedom of action. It was thought that public officials did not have the same incentive to oppress their workers because of the absence of a profit motive, and the fair treatment
sought to be coerced by collective bargaining in private industry was,
in the public sector, compelled by law.'1
However, since the passage of the Wagner Act over 30 years
ago, 12 labor relations in the private sector have been undergoing a
process of refinement in response to this act as well as other labor
legislation. As a result a new balance of power has been established
which tends to promote an equality of bargaining positions between
labor and management along with a commensurate improvement of
employment conditions compared with those prevailing prior to the
Wagner Act.
Meanwhile, employment conditions in the public sector have not
remained at a parity with those in private enterprise. Whatever advantages public employees may have enjoyed have been surpassed by
the advances gained by their industrial counterparts through collective bargaining.' 3 Public employers can no longer point with
pride to the job security provided in the merit system, the grievance procedures and other protections of the civil service laws,14 or
the favorable wages paid to their employees. 5 The industrial employee is better paid,'" and job security is provided by grievance pro"Mugford v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745
(1945); Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946).
1249

Star. 450 (1935).

13 See Zack, Why Public Employees Strike, 23 ARE. J. 69, 70-71 (1968).
14 Several states have not enacted civil service laws. Even where they are in force,
however, they rarely include all municipal employees. See E. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF
THE CML SERVIcE 321 (1958); Vogel, What About the Rights of the Public Employer?, 1 LAB. .J. 604, 617 (1950).
15 For a comparison of the economic status of public and private employees, see
Rains, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 8 LAB. L.J. 548 (1957); Note,
Labor Relations In the PublicService, 75 HARv. L. REV. 391, 409 n.111 (1961). The
theory that public employees as a class ever enjoyed a position of economic superiority
has been challenged on the ground that the notion is a misconception of the evils of the
spoils system, reflective of the attitude of the public toward civil servants. Agger, The
Government and its Employees, 47 YALE LJ. 1109, 1110-11 (1938).
16 See notes 14 & 15 supra.
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cedures and seniority clauses contained in collective bargaining
agreements. The plight of the public employee is further aggravated by the fact that he does not have an effective method by which
he can lodge his complaints. Unlike the industrial employee who
can ascertain the ultimate repositories of authority, the public employee is hampered by the fragmentation of authority inherent in
governmental structures. Administrative personnel rarely have control over such matters as wages and hours, 17 but even where they
do have a measure of discretion public officials are not responsible
to their employees. Instead they are subject to numerous pressures
adverse to their employees' interests, rendering the position of the
public employees analogous to that of their industrial counterparts.
Both municipal and industrial employers are under pressure to maximize productivity and minimize expenses. Although the adversity
imposed by the profit motive is absent in public employment, nevertheless, the desires of public officials to retain office and to achieve
advancement and prestige tend -to make them more responsive to
the demands of the taxpayers than to those of the public employees. 8 Thus, these political considerations have their ultimate
economic impact upon the wages paid to public employees. In the
absence of collective bargaining, public employees must seek to improve their condition through the political process, and the sovereign
has not been notably sympathetic.
II.

THE DUTY TO BARGAIN

Although the right of municipal employees to organize has been
widely recognized, 9 for the most part the judiciary has refused to
place upon the municipalities a reciprocal duty to meet with their
employees or their representatives to discuss the terms of employment. Such a duty has not been imposed on the ground that negotiations would be futile because the employment relationship has
been deemed a matter of exclusive legislative concern and could not
be made the subject of an enforceable contract2 0 Additionally, while
17 See generally E. KAPLAN, supra note

IsId.at 318-19;

14.

Agger, supra note 15, at 1109-10.

19 The right of public employees to organize has been protected by state authority,
e.g., N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 19; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221 (1965); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
111.70 (Supp. 1968), and by judicial decision, e.g., Potts v. Hay, 229 Ark. 830, 318

S.W.2d 826 (1958).
However, some states specifically prohibit public employees
from organizing, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 55, §§ 317(1)-(4) (1960).
20 E.g., Local 507, IBEW v. City of Hastings, 179 Neb. 455, 138 N.W.2d 822
(1965); Turnpike Authority v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 83
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the propriety of public employees participating in the political process of decision-making has been generally acknowledged and they
have been permitted to promote their interests by lobbying and rallying public support as well as petitioning their employers and presenting grievances,"' their methods have not been particularly productive toward achieving their goals.
For example, in order for a lobbying right to be effective the
municipal employees must be able to bring considerable pressure to
bear on the legislators; however, this tactic is beyond the capabilities of most public employee organizations. Similarly, while the
municipality must receive and consider the proposals of the employees, it is not obligated to discuss their merits or to respond with
counter-proposals. 22 The employees' suggestions are regarded as
recommendations that may be completely ignored since the final decision rests with the legislative body 28 rather ,than with the negotiating parties. Thus, the formal procedures available to the public
servants merely provide for unilateral communications instead of
the types of exchanges normally attributed to collective bargaining
sessions.
The reluctance of the courts to impose a duty to bargain upon
the public employer reflects their misconception of the meaning of
a duty to bargain in "good faith" as understood in private industry.
It does not mean that the legislative body will be stripped of its
24
discretion and forced to agree to the dictates of its employees.
Rather, good faith bargaining means the parties are required to
meet, submit proposals and counter-proposals, exchange information, and provide reasonable explanations of their positions. 25 AlN.J. Super. 389, 200 A.2d 134 (Ch. 1964); City of Seattle v. Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 39 L.R.R.M. 2602 (Wash. Super Ct. 1956).
21
E.g., Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239,206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
22
Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946);
Local 507, IBEW v. City of Hastings, 179 Neb. 455, 138 N.W.2d 822 (1965); American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Keene, 108 N.H. 68, 227 A.2d 602
(1967).
23 Id.
24
Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 875, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607 (Sup.
Ct. 1943), where the court stated:
To tolerate or recognize any combination of civil service employees of the
government as a labor organization or union is not only incompatible with the
spirit of democracy, but inconsistent with every principle upon which our government is founded. Nothing is more dangerous to the public welfare than to
admit that hired servants of the State can dictate to the government the hours,
wages and conditions under which they will carry on essential services vital to
the welfare, safety and security of the citizen.
2
5 NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949); NLRB v. Truit
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though the imposition of such a duty may well require public officials to repudiate their authoritarian approach to personnel management, it would not be repulsive to -the legislative process for the
ultimate decision of whether to accept or reject the agreement would
still remain with the legislators. Finally, requiring the public employers and employees to engage in good faith negotiations would
not only provide a formal vehicle through which grievances could be
raised but also would raise the distinct possibility of the promotion
of stable labor relations in the public service."'
III.

THE AUTHORITY OF A MUNICIPALITY TO ENTER
INTO A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

Assuming that during the negotiation process the parties are
able to conclude what the terms of the employment relationship
should be, it would seem desirable to record the results in a mutually
enforceable collective bargaining agreement. However, the authority of a municipality to enter into such an agreement is questionable
and is dependent upon the extent of its general contractual power.
This power is legislative in origin and may be either expressly conferred by statute or charter or it may be inferred from the power of
the municipality to perform designated functions, in which case it
is deemed authorized to enter into contracts which are "necessary"
27
for the execution of those activities.
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). In addition, the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964), provides that "[r]o bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representatives of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith . . . but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."
There are some indications that the courts may impose a duty to bargain upon municipalities. See Turnpike Authority v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 83 N.J. Super. 389, 200 A.2d 134 (Ch. 1964) (public employer must meet
with its employees or their representatives and consider in good faith the grievances
and proposals of the employees); School Comm. v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, 60
L.R.R.M. 2314 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1965). In Pawtucket, the court overruled a demurrer
to the allegation that the school board refused to enter into good faith negotiations with
the teachers on the ground that it could not rule as a matter ot law that relief was unavailable. Declaring that the absence of a statutory mandate to bargain was not controlling, the court asserted that "the right to present collectively a demand is a worthless
right unless that demand may (1) be presented effectively or reasonably effectively, and
(2) that the demand will be received and given reasonable consideration." Id. at 2317.
26 Participation in debate often produces changes in a seemingly fixed position
either because new facts are brought to light or because the strengths and weaknesses of
the several arguments become apparent. Sometimes the parties hit upon some novel
compromise of an issue which has been thrashed over and over. Much is gained by
giving each side a better picture of the strength of the other's convictions. Cox, The
Duty to Bargainin Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1412 (1958).
27
E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.05 (3d ed. 1966).
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The refusal to recognize the authority of a municipality to enter
into a collective bargaining agreement in the absence of express
statutory authorization has rested primarily upon the premise that
such contracts involve an unlawful delegation of legislative authority.2 The entire employment relationship has been deemed a matter of exclusive legislative concern, and since the legislature is the
repository of the trust of the electorate it must remain free to exercise its official discretion for the promotion of the public welfare.
Particularly, the allocation of the municipality's resources is a matter over which the legislative body must have continuing discretion
and may not be inhibited by contract. 9 Thus, it is concluded that
the terms of employment may not be made the subject of a collective
bargaining agreement.30
Truthfully, however, these arguments are more the result of an
emotive reaction against the concept of unionism in the public service than the product of legal analysis. The fact is that municipalities have enjoyed a tradition of unilateralism and paternalism while
avoiding any responsibilities toward their employees under the guise
of governmental efficiency. As a result, they are not disposed to accept the give-andtake process of collective bargaining, preferring
instead -to deal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 1
As a matter of legal theory, there is little reason to hold col28

Turnpike Authority v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 83
N.J. Super. 389, 200 A.2d 134 (Ch. 1964); City of Seattle v. Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 39 L.R.R.M. 2602 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1956)
2
9Local 321, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Water Works Board, 55 L.RR.M.
2950 (Ala. 1964); Nurter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741
(1946); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
SOE.g., Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962); Water Works
local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946); Mugford v. Mayor
& City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945); Local 507, IBEW v.
City of Hastings, 179 Neb.455, 138 N.W.2d 822 (1965).
31A report of the American Bar Association recently criticized the failure of the
states to provide comprehensive legislation to protect the public employees:
Government which denies to its employees the right to strike against the
people, no matter how just might be the grievances, owes to its public servants
an obligation to provide working conditions and standards of managementemployee relationships which would make unnecessary and unwarranted any
need for such employees to resort to stoppage of public business. It is too
idealistic to depend solely on a hoped-for beneficent attitude of public administrators. Promises of well-meaning public officials imbued with a sense of
high authority who resort to the pretense of alleged limitations on their powers to avoid dealing forthrightly with representatives of their subordinate
employees only aggravate grievances. Some practical machinery for handling
grievances, fancied or real, needs to be provided to insure employees that
public management is concerned with their just complaints. Quoted in Cornell, Collective Bargaining by Public Employee Groups, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
43, 57 (1958).
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lective bargaining agreements by municipalities ultra vires. The
notion that a municipality may avoid its contractual obligations on
some contorted theory of legislative prerogative is indeed a strange
anomaly in the law of municipal corporations, and in essence denies
the capacity of a municipality to contract. In no other contractual
affairs have such restrictions been imposed. For example, it is universally recognized that a municipality has the implied authority to
enter into individual employment contracts for the performance of
municipal functions, 32 and the insistence that a municipality is powerless to enter into one agreement covering the terms of employment
for many of its employees but rather must engage in a multitude of
33
negotiations is an incongruity beyond reason.
The policy underlying the nondelegability of legislative authority has been to prohibit the legislature from divesting itself of its
governmental functions. 34 Municipal collective bargaining agreements in no way contravene this policy. They do not purport to
vest the public employees with the power to determine the terms
and conditions of their employment. The ascertainment of these
matters is clearly within the legislative prerogative. 35 Rather, such
agreements introduce an element of certainty into the employment
relationship, defining the rights and responsibilities of the parties.
When faced with the dilemma of retaining full control over the employment relationship or surrendering this power in order to promote stable labor relations, the legislature may well elect the latter
course as the best means of protecting the public interest.36 If the
legislature has agreed to the terms of employment with its employees and has made them the subject of a contract there has been
an exercise of legislative discretion in the first instance, 37 and the
38
bargaining agreement should not be held ultra vires.
32 E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 27, at § 29.05.

33 Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Project, 78 Ariz. 30,275 P.2d 393 (1954).
34 Firefighters Local 293 v. Gardner, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 327, 178 A.2d 691 (C.P.
1961), aff'd Inem., 406 Pa. 395 (1962), where the court stated "[fif the delegation of
power is to make the law, which involves a discretion of what the law shall be, then the
power is nondelegable. If the conferred authority is the power or discretion to execute
the law already determined and circumscribed, then the delegation is unobjectionable."
Id. at 334, 178 A.2d at 695. Accord, Wyoming ex rel. Firefighters Local 946 v. City of
Laramie, 68 L.R.R.M. 2038 (Wyo. 1968). See generally E. McQUILLAN, supra note
27, at §§ 10.38-.42.
35 See cases cited note 34 supra.
36 Civil Service Forum v. New York Transit Authority, 3 Misc. 2d 346, 151 N.Y.S.
2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 4 App. Div. 2d 117, 163 N.Y.S.2d
476 (1957), aII'd luem., 4 N.Y.2d 866, 150 N.E.2d 705, 174 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1958).
37 See text accompanying notes 64-70 infra.
38
The modern trend is to hold that collective bargaining agreements by munic-
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IV.

THE SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT

Once the authority of a municipality to enter into a collective
bargaining contract is established, there remains for consideration
the subject matter of the agreement. Of particular importance are
union security provisions and arbitration clauses. Although both of
these items are typically included in the bargaining agreements of
private industry, their incorporation into public bargaining agreements is complicated by the tenets of municipal corporation law.
Union Security Provisions

A.

The initial question arises as to whether union security provisions are compatible with concepts of public employment. In private industry these provisions are normally sought by the majority
union in order to protect itself from raids by rival unions, to assure
itself of the membership necessary to maintain its status, and to provide the finances needed to conduct its activities. Often, such security agreements provide at a minimum for the exclusive recognition of the majority union as the bargaining representative of the
employees, and may also provide for an agency 9 or union shop 4°
as well as for a dues checkoff. 41 The securing of the proceeding protections has been recognized as a means of promoting stable labor
relations by enabling the employer and the union to achieve a working relationship. Moreover, these agreements tend to develop responsible union leadership by minimizing the temptation of a union
to make excessive demands which might result if the union had to
maintain its membership in a competitive atmosphere.
Although the authority of a municipality to agree to union security provisions appears to be inherent in its powers to enter into
collective bargaining agreements, 4 the validity of these provisions
palities are not ultra vires and that they are enforceable. E.g., Norwalk Teachers Ass'n
v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); Illinois Educ. Ass'n v. Board
of Educ., 76 111 App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966); Board of Regents v. Local 1258,
Food and Allied Workers, 68 L.R.RM. 2677 (Iowa 1968); Local 611, IBEW v. Town
of Farmington, 60 L.R.R1M. 2001 (N.M. 1965).
39 An agency shop agreement requires that the employees must either join the
union or pay to the union a sum equal to the dues paid by members. R. SMITH & L.
MERRIIELD, LABOR RELATIONS LAW
40

603 (1960).

The union shop requires that all employees become members of the union within
a prescribed period of time after initial employment Id. at 588-89.
41
A checkoff is the deduction of union dues from the employee's wages which are
paid directly to the union. Id. at 591.
42
See Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union, 108 N.H. 416, 237 A.2d 668 (1968);
Civil Service Forum v. New York Transit Authority, 3 Misc. 2d 346, 151 N.Y.S.2d
402 (Sup. C. 1956).
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has been attacked primarily on three grounds: (1) They constitute
a discriminatory preference for union labor which is inconsistent
with the policy that all persons should be free to aspire to the public
service. 43 (2) Such provisions disrupt the orderly conduct of personnel administration.4 4 (3) They deprive public employees of
their constitutional right to petition and present grievances. 45
Nevertheless, limited security provisions designed to avoid these
objections have been sustained. For example, in Civil Service Forum
v. New York Transit Authority,4 6 an agreement which provided that
the majority union was the only employee organization permitted to
present and process employee grievances was ruled valid over the
constitutional objection because the contract specifically preserved
to each employee the right to process his own grievances. The court
held that the power of the municipal authority to agree to this provision was reasonably inferrable from its general contractual power,
and indicated that this provision was necessary "to avoid being harrassed by employees who might shop from one union to another in
an attempt to gain support in the presentation of grievances, and in
the interests of efficiency in processing and determining grievances
which are presented. ' 47 Similarly, in Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union,48 a bargaining agreement which provided that new and rehired
employees must join the union and present to it a dues checkoff authorization but did not require the employees to maintain their union membership was held to be valid. The Tremblay court held
that the security clauses were neither in conflict with the personnel
policy of the city nor did they interfere with its power to administer
the affairs of its police department. Hence, on the basis of the cited
authority and the inherent contractual power of a municipality to
enter into a collective bargaining agreement, there would seem to be
4
3 Mugford v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745
(1945).
44 Id.; Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St.313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947).
45
See Civil Service Forum v. New York Transit Authority, 3 Misc. 2d 346, 151
N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1956). It should also be noted that union and agency shop
clauses in agreements in private industry have been held invalid on the grounds that
they conflicted with the state's right-to-work laws. E.g., Retail Clerks Local 1625 v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963). Presumably the same rule would apply to agreements in the public sector in those states having such legislation.
46 Civil Service Forum v. New York Transit Authority, 4 App. Div. 2d 117, 163
N.Y.S.2d 476 (1957).
47 Id. at 124, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
4868 L.R.R.M. 2070 (N.H. 1968); accord, Bausch v. City of New York, 67
L.R.R.M. 2994 (N.Y. 1968) (granting checkoff privilege to majority union but denying
it to minority union held not a denial of due process or equal protection of the law).
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no persuasive reason for precluding it from agreeing to legitimate
union security provisions.
B. Arbitration
In private industry the relative bargaining positions of the parties
are more or less equalized because of the threat of such economic
weapons as the strike and lockout. These devices, however, are for
the most part lacking in public employment because the necessity of
providing essential services forecloses the municipality from a lockout, and for similar reasons municipal employees have been prohibited from striking.49 But even in private industry the strike and
lockout have not been universally accepted as essential to successful
labor relations. The threat of economic disaster which may attend
the exercise of these means of coercion has led many to repudiate
their use and instead to agree to submit their disputes to an impartial arbitrator whose decision is final and binding.2
By hypothesis, it is suggested that the introduction of arbitration
as a means of resolving disputes in public employment may be an
effective means of reducing the threat of illegal strikes by establishing a process where the positions of the parties are equalized. However, the extent to which this process can be utilized in the absence
of statutory authorization is questionable. Ideally, the public employer and its employees should be compelled to submit all disputed
issues for arbitration as the last stage of the negotiation process.
This would include disputes arising during the negotiations of new
contract terms as well as disputes arising under existing contracts.
Alternatively, they should at least be allowed to voluntarily submit
these matters for arbitration.-' Admittedly, such a procedure might
precipitate deadlocks that could be resolved in the absence of arbitration procedures, 2 but such resolution is likely to be one-sided, be49

Note, supra note 1, at 554-59.
0 Arbitration has been termed the quid pro quo of the right to strike, and it has
been held that the employe's duty to arbitrate is conditioned upon the union's compliance with its no-strike pledge. UAW v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus., 242 F.2d
536 (6th Cir. 1957); Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union, 235 F.2d
108 (7th Cir. 1956); International Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring
Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948). In a recent case, however, the United States Supreme
Court showed its preference for arbitration when it ordered the employer to arbitrate
an employee's grievance notwithstanding the union violation of the no-strike provision. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
51
See Note, Arbitration of Disputes over New Labor Contract Terms, 15 W. RES.
L REV. 735 (1964).
52
See Note, Quasi-Legislative Arbitration Agreements, 64 CoLuM. L. REv. 109,
5

111 (1964).
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ing a result of the municipality's superior position. Nevertheless,
the uncertainty of the arbitrator's decision could exert sufficient
pressure on the parties to resolve their differences, as well as provide
for the termination of disputes that might otherwise culminate in an
illegal strike.
With the solitary exception of collective bargaining agreements,
it is universally recognized that a municipality, in the absence of a
prohibitive statute, has the authority to submit contractual disputes
for arbitration; this authority is deemed inherent in the powers of
the municipality to contract, to sue and be sued, and to settle
claims. 5 3 In order to exercise this power, however, there must be
an ordinance, resolution, or state statute permitting the municipality to submit issues for arbitration. 54 In this regard, it has been held
that a municipality is a "person" within the meaning of a statute
providing that all persons may submit any controversy for arbitration.5 5 With respect to collective bargaining agreements two views
are apparent. The early cases uniformly held that the inclusion of
arbitration agreements by municipalities were unenforceable because
they involved an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. 56 On
the other hand, the recent trend has been to uphold these agreements.5 7 Although there is some authority suggesting that a munici5 8
pality may agree only to arbitrate existing contractual disputes,
53 E.g., District of Columbia v. Bailey, 171 U.S. 161 (1898); Township of Walnut
v. Rankin, 70 Iowa 65, 29 N.W. 806 (1886); Champline v. Overseers of the Poor, 34
Va. (7 Leigh) 231 (1836); see Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 569 (1968).
54 171 U.S. at 161; Brady v. City of Brooklyn, 1 Barb. 584 (N.Y. 1847); Hollister
v. Pawlet, 43 Vt. 425 (1871). Although the power to submit to arbitration rests with
the legislative body of the municipality, this power may be exercised by a municipal
officer upon legislative authorization. City of Detroit v. Jackson, 1 Dougl. 106
(Mich. 1843); Johnson v. Prineville, 100 Ore. 105, 196 P. 817 (1921).
55 City of Springfield v. Walker, 42 Ohio St. 543 (1885); McKennie v. Charlottesville & A. Ry. 110 Va. 70, 65 S.E. 503 (1909).
56
E.g., Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962); Mugford v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945); Washington
ex rel. Firefighters Local 350 v. Johnson, 35 L.R.R.M. 2434 (Wash. 1955). In the
Johnson case the court went so far as to hold invalid an amendment to the city's home
rule charter providing for compulsory arbitration of wage disputes between the city
and its firemen on the ground that the amendment involved an unlawful delegation of
legislative power to the arbitrator in violation of the state constitution which vested the
city councils with the legislative powers.
57 E.g., Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482
(1951); American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. School District of Benton Harbor, 66 L.R.R.M. 2419 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1967); American Fed'n of State, County
& Mun. Employees v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis. 2d 209, 151 N.W.2d 30 (1967);
cf. Wyoming ex el. Firefighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 68 L.R.R.M. 2038 (Wyo.
1968) (upholding the validity of a compulsory arbitration statute as a means of resolving public employee disputes).
58
Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
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the better reasoned cases have sustained clauses providing for the
arbitration of disputes arising throughout the term of the contract. 9
Even though it does not appear that the arbitration process is
available for the resolution of disputes arising during the negotiation of the terms of the agreement, it is an essential requisite for
the resolution of disputes arising under the collective bargaining
agreement, especially where no other grievance machinery is available. If disputes were decided unilaterally by the municipal officials the hostility of the employees would be aroused. Likewise,
the availability of the judicial process, along with its commensurate
expense and slowness, is more likely to aggravate the employment
relationship than to stabilize it. Therefore, the most acceptable alternative for the resolution of employment disputes, and one that
will be more likely to promote satisfactory labor relations, is to include an arbitration provision as one of the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.
V.

PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS

Although the municipality may have the power to enter into collective bargaining agreements, further inquiry must be made to ascertain who is the appropriate official to contract in behalf of the
municipality, for a municipality is not bound by contracts made by
unauthorized officials. As is the case with municipal authority, municipal officers6 0 have only that authority which is conferred upon
them expressly or by necessary implication by the applicable statutes,
charter provisions, and ordinances." Presumably the arguments
noted earlier with regard to municipal authority would be similarly
applicable to the authority of its officials.62 Thus, it would seem
that where an official has either express or implied authority to
make employment contracts, his authority should extend to the mak6 3
ing of collective bargaining agreements.
Once the problems of contractual authority are settled, the procedural formalities prescribed by statute or charter for a valid municipal contract must be satisfied.6" Of particular importance are the
59 See cases cited note 57 suapra.
60
E. MCQUILLAN, supra noe 27, at § 29.02.
61 Id. at § 12.126.
6

2 See text accompanying notes 28-38 supra.
3 Where the contract is within the powers of the municipality but the contracting
official is unauthorized, the contract is deemed to be voidable and might be enforced
upon the principles of estoppel, ratification, or implied contract. McQUILLAN, supra
note 27, at §§ 29.02, -.26, -.103, and -. 110.
64
Food, Beverage & Express Drivers Local 145 v. City of Shelton, 46 L.R.R.M.
6
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common requirements that a contract must be specifically authorized by an ordinance or resolution, or that contracts requiring the
disbursement of money must be preceeded by an appropriation.6 5
These requirements clearly indicate that the success of the collective
negotiations and their culmination in a mutually binding contract
are dependent not only upon the ability of the negotiators to resolve their differences, but also upon their ability to persuade the
legislators to approve the results. Whether meaningful negotiations can take place under these circumstances is subject to question;66 however, the discretion of the legislature in this area may not
be absolute. Recently it was held that the legislative body may not
refuse to make an adequate appropriation which was necessary to
support a collective bargaining agreement on the grounds that it was
opposed to the unionization of the municipality's employees, but
rather it must base its decision on the economic feasibility of grant67
ing the request.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As has been indicated, one of the primary sources of dissatisfaction by public employees is the growing dichotomy between the
benefits of employment in the public and private sectors, and the
absence of meaningful procedures by which public employees can
promote their welfare in the face of numerous adverse interests.
Experience in the private sector has shown that a fundamental
requisite to stable labor relations is the duty to engage in good faith
negotiations with a view to entering into a mutually enforceable
contract. In the public sector, however, the adoption of this process
has been inhibited by the judiciary whose hostility to the notion of
unionism in the public service has led to the exclusion of municipal
collective bargaining agreements from the traditional tenets of mu2235 (Conn. 1960) (city charter required an ordinance to fix the salaries of the city's
employees).
65
E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 27, at §§ 29.19.-.20.
66
See Wollett, The Public Employee at the BargainingTable: Promise or Illusion?,
15 LABOR L.J. 8 (1964).
67 Town of Milford v. Board of Labor Relations, 66 L.R.R.M. 2361 (Conn. 1967).
This problem has been somewhat alleviated, particularly with respect to craft employees, by prevailing wage legislation which fixes the compensation paid to public employees with reference to the wages paid for comparable work in private industry. E.g.,
N.Y. LABOR LAW § 220 (McKinney 1965). In Miller v. City & County of San Francisco, 174 Cal. App. 2d 109, 344 P.2d 102 (1959), the court sustained the validity of a
prevailing wage provision contained in the city charter which vested with the civil service commission the authority to pay municipal employees wages comparable to those
with wages paid in the private sector.
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nicipal corporation law. It is incumbent upon the judiciary to overcome this hostility, to recognize the advantages of the collective bargaining and its compatibility with public personnel administration,
and to lend judicial support to the development of this process in
municipal labor relations. Although it is conceded that collective
bargaining may not provide a panacea for the problems of labor relations in the public sector, nevertheless, the acceptance of this process may substantially alleviate the threat of illegal strikes and other
disruptive practices, and may ultimately provide the basis for stabilizing the employment relationship in the public service.
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